This paper investigates the effects of bank loan availability on the trade credit and credit card demand of small firms, using firm-level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. We find that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit card debt when facing credit constraints imposed by banks. These results provide evidence of a pecking order of debt financing, where firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds when bank loans are not available.
Introduction
Does the availability of bank loans affect the trade credit demand of small firms? At first glance, the answer to this question seems to be an obvious yes. If a firm cannot obtain all of its desired funding from banks, it is likely that the firm will turn to alternative sources of funds, including trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 ).
Yet the empirical evidence relating loan availability to trade credit demand is mixed. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) found variables measuring bank relationship strength to be significantly related to trade credit demand, but they did not identify a significant relation between trade credit demand and direct measures of credit availability, such as the outcome of the most recent loan application. Combined, these results are difficult to interpret. Why do firms with weak banking relationships use more trade credit, whereas firms that have actually been denied credit do not?
This paper revisits the question of whether the availability of bank credit affects trade credit demand, using data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB). A unique feature of the NFIB survey is that it asked respondents to rank bank loans, retained earnings, trade credit, and credit cards as sources of funds. Because trade credit and credit cards can be expensive forms of financing, they should typically be less desirable choices than bank loans or retained earnings.
1 Yet, many sample firms rank trade credit or credit cards as more important than bank loans, retained earnings, or both. We classify these firms as having a high level of trade credit demand in our empirical tests. The two advantages of this demand measure are that it focuses on firms with the most extreme levels of trade credit demand and it does not require us to properly identify an equation to distinguish between trade credit demand and trade credit supply, which would be necessary if we were using accounts payable from the balance sheet (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997) .
Our goal is to determine if credit limits imposed on small firms by banks increase the perceived importance of trade credit or credit cards, despite the high potential costs of these financing sources. In the primary tests, we measure credit availability based on whether the firm's most recent loan application was denied or approved. In sensitivity tests, credit availability is inferred from survey responses to the question of whether the firm was able to satisfy its borrowing needs over the preceding three-year period. Negative responses to this question include both loan denials and approvals for smaller than requested amounts.
Although our main hypothesis is that loan availability affects trade credit demand, a firm's trade credit liabilities can also influence a bank's loan approval decision. For example, banks could deny (or limit) credit to firms with unusually large 1 The cost of trade credit financing depends on the structure of the terms offered to the purchaser, which is very industry-specific. Terms requiring a net payment after, say, 30 days, impose no direct financing cost, although this cost can be incorporated into the product price. Two-part terms, however, provide the purchaser with a discount if payment is made within a specified shorter period, with the balance due (without the discount) at a later date. If a purchaser does not take a discount, the effective annual interest rate can be quite high (Wilner, 2000; Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1999) . In addition, indirect costs such as higher prices or less favorable delivery dates in the future can increase the cost of trade credit when a firm does not make timely payments. Credit cards can also be an expensive source of funds if the firm does not pay off the account's new charges in full monthly due to high interest rates and late payment fees.
trade credit balances, because excessive trade credit use could be a symptom of weaknesses in a firm's business. We control for this endogeneity by modeling the trade credit and bank lending decisions using a simultaneous equation system. The results show that firms facing credit constraints are more likely to report a high level of trade credit (or credit card) demand. Thus, we provide direct evidence of a link between bank credit constraints and trade credit demand.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares trade credit to bank loans as a financing source and summarizes the empirical evidence linking trade credit demand with bank loan availability. Section 3 describes the NFIB data. Section 4 outlines our empirical approach and provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Section 5 reports the test results, and Section 6 concludes.
Credit availability and trade credit demand:
Theory and evidence
The role of trade credit in a firm's capital structure depends on how quickly the firm can pay off new balances. If a firm makes timely payments, trade credit can be a complement to bank loans in its capital structure. However, when a firm cannot make timely payments, perhaps because it faces cash flow constraints and additional bank loans are not available, trade credit can be an expensive source of funds and can be a substitute for bank loans. Typically, trade credit is a short-term source of funds, used to finance a portion of a firm's investments in inventory or accounts receivable.
3 In this role, trade credit offers several benefits relative to bank loans. For example, trade credit allows firms to better match the timing of cash outlays for the cost of goods sold with the cash receipts from sales (see Ferris, 1981) . Trade credit can also play a role in a firm's quality control efforts. As argued by Smith (1987) and Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1994) , trade credit allows a firm to verify product quality before paying. Finally, trade credit can offer firms a greater degree of financial flexibility than bank loans. Due to its revolving nature, trade credit balances naturally increase or decrease with temporary fluctuations in business activity, and, when facing temporary cash flow problems, firms can find it less costly to delay trade credit payments than to renegotiate the payment terms of bank loans.
To minimize the costs of trade credit, firms must make payments within the discount (when available) or net periods, limiting the maturity of a firm's trade credit balances. When the sum of a firm's days sales in inventory and days sales in accounts receivable exceeds this maturity period (e.g., when this sum exceeds 30 days), the firm must finance a portion of its accounts receivable and inventory balances using bank loans or equity. Thus, bank loans and short-term trade credit can play complementary roles in a firm's capital structure, and it is not necessary for credit constraints to be present for firms to employ trade credit as a short-term source of funds.
If a firm faces cash flow constraints because bank loans are not available, the firm could respond by delaying some trade credit payments. As a firm's trade credit payments slow, a greater portion of the firm's working capital will be financed with trade credit and, in extreme cases, delayed trade credit payments could help fund capital investments. This longer term use of trade credit is sometimes possible because vendors may continue lending to a firm (when banks will not) for three reasons. First, the short-term nature of trade credit allows vendors to continually monitor a firm's payment pattern (see Emery, 1984; Smith, 1987; Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner, 1988; Biais and Gollier, 1997) and to adjust sale prices or terms accordingly. Second, the collateral value of a firm's inventory is likely to be higher to trade creditorsespecially, if their claim is secured-than it would be to a bank (see Longhofer and Santos, 2003) . Finally, foregone discounts provide a high effective interest rate, compensating vendors for the risk of eventual nonpayment. When used in this manner, trade credit can be an expensive substitute for bank loans. Rajan (1994, 1997) provide most of the existing evidence linking credit availability and trade credit, using the Board of Governors Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. In the 1994 paper, the percentage of trade credit paid late and the amount of trade credit discounts foregone are used as proxies for trade credit demand. In their model, firms first exhaust the least expensive sources of funds, moving down a pecking order to fund all positive net positive value investments.
4 They defined internal cash as the cheapest source, followed by bank lending, and finally trade credit. Their primary empirical conclusions are that firms rely more on trade credit (i.e., they delay trade credit payments or take fewer discounts) if they have shorter banking relationships (in terms of time doing business with their principal financial institution), are located in less concentrated markets (making it harder for a lender to intertemporally subsidize loan rates because of the high degree of competition), and do business with more financial institutions (increasing the free-rider disincentive from investing in private information). Petersen and Rajan (1997) model trade credit demand as a function of trade credit supply, the firm's total demand for credit, bank credit availability, and the price of bank credit. Using a simultaneous equation approach, they found a significant negative relation between banking relationship length and trade credit demand. Petersen and Rajan also identified a positive association between trade credit demand and a variable indicating that the firm's most recent loan request was denied, but this coefficient is not significant.
These findings are curious because they imply firms with weak bank relationships use more trade credit, whereas firms that have actually been denied credit do not. In theory, bank relationship strength influences trade credit demand through (actual or anticipated) loan approval decisions. If a weak banking relationship increases the likelihood of loan denial, as Cole (1998) finds, and if loan denial increases trade credit demand, then trade credit demand is inversely related to bank relationship strength. Because of the underlying collinearity between banking relationship strength and loan application outcomes, the inclusion of both banking relationship strength and loan denial variables on the right-hand side of an equation explaining trade credit use (as in Petersen and Rajan, 1997) could produce results that are difficult to interpret.
In this paper, we revisit the question of whether loan application outcomes (the most direct measure of credit availability) are related to trade credit demand (as Petersen and Rajan's, 1994 , pecking order model suggests). Our results extend those from the Petersen and Rajan studies because we use data from a different survey of small firms, covering a later period. In addition, we use a simultaneous equation system in which trade credit demand is a function of loan availability and loan availability is a function of banking relationship strength to control for the collinearity between banking relationship strength and loan application outcomes.
Description of survey data
The data in this study come from the 1995 NFIB Survey, the fifth in a series that extends back to 1980. The purpose of the survey is to collect information about the credit requirements of small businesses and the banking relationships of these firms, using a random sample of the 500,000 members of the NFIB. 5 Eighteen thousand surveys were sent initially, and after two mailings, 3,642 completed surveys were available. To improve the response rate, the questionnaire was mailed twice within a two-week interval to the random sample of NFIB members and duplicate responses were eliminated. fit their firm. 7 Table 1 compares the distributions of the 1995 NFIB and the 1993 SSBF samples and shows that firms in the NFIB survey tend to be slightly larger in terms of employees, sales, and assets. In addition, the firms in the NFIB sample tend to be slightly older than those in the SSBF survey. Despite these differences, both samples focus on small, privately owned firms. By using an independent sample of small firms to test existing hypotheses about trade credit, we provide additional evidence about the general applicability of conclusions drawn from earlier work.
Model specification
The empirical question we address is whether the availability of bank loans affects trade credit demand. Thus, we do not attempt to develop a general model explaining both short term (when trade credit and bank loans can be complements) and longer term (when trade credit and bank loans can be substitutes) trade credit demand. Instead, we focus specifically on the possibility that credit constraints cause some firms to use trade credit as a substitute for bank loans.
Although our main hypothesis is that loan availability affects a firm's trade credit use, trade credit liabilities can also influence a bank's loan approval decision. For example, banks could interpret the excessive use of trade credit as a symptom of underlying weaknesses in a firm's business and restrict credit availability to the firm. Unless the estimation method addresses this possibility, coefficient estimates of the effect of credit availability on trade credit use are likely to be biased. Thus, we model the trade credit and bank lending decisions using a recursive, simultaneous equation system to control for this potential endogeneity.
We first model trade credit demand as a function of bank loan availability, trade credit price, and firm/industry characteristics, as shown in Equation (1).
Trade Credit Demand = {Credit Availability, Price, Control Variables}. (1) We then model the credit available to a firm, before consideration of its trade credit policy, as a function of firm risk, banking relationship strength, and market structure, as shown in Equation (2).
Credit Availability
The estimation of this simultaneous system is discussed in detail in Section 5.1. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe the survey proxies used as the variables in Equations (1) and (2), and Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics.
Dependent variables

Trade credit demand
The NFIB survey asked firms to separately list their two most important sources of funds for working capital and capital outlays from a menu that included bank Asset value at end of last fiscal year: 1 = under $50K; 2 = $50K-100K; 3 = $100K-200K; 4 = $200K-500K; 5 = $500K-1,000K; 6 = $1,000K-2,000K; 7 = $2,000K-5,000K; 8 = $5,000K-10,000K; and 9 = over $10,000K
3.64 1.80 3,253 GROWTH Average annual change in the gross sales over the past 3 years: 1 = declined more than 5%; 2 = no change (−5% to +5%); 3 = grew 6-10%; 4 = grew 11-20%; and 5 = grew 20% or more 2.80 1.23 3,190 LENGTH Last time owner changed principal financial institution: 1 = within the last year; 2 = 1-2 years ago; 3 = 2-3 years ago; 4 = 3-4 years ago; 5 = 4-5 years ago; and 6 = more than 5 years ago loans, retained earnings, trade credit, credit cards, and other sources of funds. These responses are used to identify firms with a high level of trade credit demand. We are primarily interested in explaining why some firms classify trade credit as an important source of funds. However, trade credit and credit cards can be close substitutes for some small firms. Credit card debt often is easier to obtain than trade credit (because issuers of credit cards can diversify their portfolios more effectively than issuers of trade credit), but high interest rates can make credit card debt costly when the outstanding balance is not paid in full monthly. To allow for possible differences between how credit constraints affect the demand for trade credit and credit cards, we define two separate 1/0 variables identifying firms with high trade credit demand.
The first, TCREDCC, takes a value of 1 if the firm ranks trade credit or credit cards as a primary or secondary source of funds for working capital, capital investments, or both, and zero otherwise. Excluding firms that did not answer the question, the mean value of TCREDCC is 0.36 (see Table 2 ).
The second, TCREDLCC, is equal to 1 if the firm ranks trade credit as a primary or secondary source of funds for working capital, capital investments, or both, and zero otherwise. If a firm lists both credit cards and trade credit as important sources of funds, the firm remains in the sample (and TCREDLCC is equal to 1). If a firm identifies credit cards, but not trade credit, as an important source of funds, we exclude the firm from the sample when TCREDLCC is the dependent variable in Equation (1). If credit cards are a less desirable source of funds than trade credit, including credit card (only) firms in the sample would confound the interpretation of the test results. Thus, the sample size in the tests using TCREDLCC as the dependent variable (2,738) is slightly lower than the sample size in the tests using TCREDCC (3,384). TCREDLCC has a mean of 0.21 (see Table 2 ).
TCREDLCC and TCREDCC are used as the dependent variable in Equation (1) in two separate sets of tests. The results of these tests provide insights about the differential effects of credit constraints on trade credit and credit card demand. Table 3 shows the correlations between TCREDCC (and separately for TCREDLCC) and three other measures of trade credit use. The purpose of this table is to evaluate how firms that are assigned a value of 1 for either TCREDCC or TCREDLCC use trade credit. That is, do these firms increase their reliance on trade credit by making more trade credit purchases, by delaying payments on those trade credit balances without discounts, or by foregoing discounts?
The first alternative measure of trade credit use, PCTCDT, is the percentage of a firm's purchases made on credit. This variable has a mean of 0.47 (Table 2 ) compared to about 0.75 for the SSBF surveys used by Rajan (1994, 1997) . Table 3 shows a positive correlation between PCTCDT and the two trade credit measures, but these correlations are not high (0.06 for TCREDCC and 0.19 for TCREDLCC). Thus, although the trade credit demand captured by TCREDCC or TCREDLCC can result in some additional trade credit purchases, as measured by PCTCDT, these additional purchases explain only a portion of this trade credit demand. The second variable, PCTDISC, reports the percentage of credit purchases with discounts for early payment. This variable has a mean of 0.24 (see Table 2 ), showing the flexibility many small firms have when deciding which trade credit payments to delay.
8 If a firm has discounts available on < 25% of its purchases, as do most sample firms, the firm could have enough flexibility to pay those bills with discounts on time, while delaying payment on bills without discounts. Table 3 reports that the correlation between PCTDISC and TCREDCC is essentially zero. Although the correlation between PCTDISC and TCREDLCC is significantly greater than zero, it is low (0.11).
Finally, the variable TDISC measures how often firms take trade credit discounts. The variable TDISC has a mean value of 0.72 (see Table 2 ), based on response categories (zero = never or rarely; 1 = usually or always). This result implies most sample firms attempt to take advantage of the available trade credit discounts. However, the correlations listed in Table 3 between TCREDCC or TCREDLCC and TDISC are negative (−0.06 and −0.01, respectively), suggesting firms take advantage of discounts slightly less frequently if they must rely heavily on trade credit or credit card debt.
Credit availability
Credit availability is measured using two variables. DENY is a 1/0 variable that takes on a value of 1 if a firm was turned down on its most recent loan request. This variable captures a hard constraint (i.e., the inability to obtain any financing from the firm's most recent loan application). In this sample, 16% of the firms were rejected in their most recent loan attempt. Although this turndown rate is far higher than the 4% in Petersen and Rajan's (1997) sample of SSBF firms, it is comparable to the overall turndown rates in the 1987 NFIB survey (17%) and the 1993 SSBF (16%). Thus, our data reflect a more representative turndown experience for small businesses than the sample in Petersen and Rajan (1997) . This variable is used as the dependent variable in Equation (2) and as an explanatory variable in Equation (1).
In a sensitivity test, credit availability is also measured using BNEEDSNO, a 1/0 variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm reports that its borrowing needs have not been met at all times over the last three years. This variable is a broader measure of credit availability than DENY, because it includes firms that had been denied on their last loan application, as well as firms that were successful in their most recent loan attempt but did not receive all desired funds. Our goal is to determine if firms that did not receive the requested amount of funds also increase their trade credit demand, along with those firms actually denied credit.
Explanatory variables
Trade credit price
The price of trade credit depends on the size of the discount offered (if any), the length of the free period, and any difference between the cash and the credit price. The NFIB data does not include variables measuring all these dimensions of trade credit price. However, PCTDISC, the percentage of purchases with an early payment discount, captures at least one dimension of trade credit price, so we use this variable as a proxy for price in Equation (1). PCTDISC is entered as a continuous variable for all percentages greater than zero. PCTDISC: 0% is a 1/0 variable that takes a value of 1 if discounts for early payment are not offered. PCTDISC is positively related and PCTDISC: 0% negatively related to TCREDLCC (and TCREDCC) if vendors use discounts to encourage prompt payments from firms that rely heavily on trade credit.
Equation (1) control variables
Control variables for the potential effects of size and industry on a firm's trade credit demand are also included in Equation (1). Size is positively related to trade credit demand if larger firms can more easily satisfy trade credit underwriting standards. A set of 1/0 variables for SALES categories is used to control for this possibility, with the under $250,000 category omitted in the estimation. A set of 1/0 variables identifies each firm's industry at the one-digit SIC classification level. Although these variables capture only very broad industry differences, they nonetheless allow us to control for some of the well-known differences in trade credit use across industries (Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1999) . Retail is the omitted category.
Finally, DIDN'T BORROW is a 1/0 variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm did not apply for a loan and thus may have to rely on trade credit for short-term external funding. One limitation of this variable is it does not discriminate between those firms that choose not to borrow because they fear that they would be turned down (they do not apply even though they want to borrow), those firms that have an aversion to borrowing, and those firms that had no need to borrow.
Firm risk
The survey provides several proxies for firm risk in Equation (2). The first is years in business (AGE) a variable used by Cole (1998) and others to control for the possibility that younger firms are more likely to be denied bank credit. AGE is entered as a set of categorical variables, to let the data determine whether the relationship is linear or nonlinear. Asset size (ASSET) is a second proxy for risk. A larger amount of assets provides more collateral for loans and should be negatively related to DENY. ASSET takes values from 1 to 9 based on the categories shown in Table 2 . The final risk measure is sales growth (GROWTH). Faster growth can reflect underlying strength in a firm's business, implying a lower risk level and reducing the chance of loan denial. GROWTH takes values from 1 to 5 based on the categories shown in Table 2 . Cole (1998) showed that the credit application decision is a function of banking relationship strength. He found that firms with longer relationships have a higher chance of being approved, whereas those with more sources for financial services have a lower chance. The survey has proxies for both variables, and we use these as explanatory variables in Equation (2). LENGTH is the amount of time the firm has done business with its primary financial institution and takes values of 1-6 based on the categories shown in Table 2 . FIUSED is the number of financial institutions used by the survey respondents.
Banking relationship strength
Market structure
Bank size and deposit concentration can also affect the loan application decision, so they are included as explanatory variables in Equation (2). For example, Scott (2004) argued that small banks (community financial institutions) have a comparative advantage in producing soft information (e.g., information about the character of a firm's owner), which is essential for evaluating loan requests from informationally opaque firms. CFI is a 1/0 variable for bank size, which takes a value of 1 if a firm's primary bank has total assets under $1 billion, and zero otherwise. Petersen and Rajan (1995) claimed that credit availability is positively affected by bank deposit concentration. A Herfindahl-Hirshmann index (HHI) of deposit concentration computed on a countywide basis is used to capture this effect and should vary negatively with DENY.
Empirical tests and results
Empirical specification
The structure of the model in Equations (1) and (2) lends itself to bivariate probit analysis because both TCREDCC (TCREDLCC) and DENY are 1/0 variables. Bivariate probit is a full information maximum likelihood estimation method designed to produce consistent and efficient estimators of the independent variables.
9 The equations to be estimated are
where
where Table 4 presents the baseline estimates of this model using first TCREDCC and then TCREDLCC as the dependent variable in Equation (3). In each case, DENY is the dependent variable in Equation (4). In Table 5 , we separate DENY into interactive variables based on firm age, and reestimate the model. To do this, we multiply DENY by three 1/0 variables: YOUNG, MIDAGE, and OLD are assigned a value of 1 if years in business is 5 years or less, between 5 and 15 years, or > 15 years, respectively, and zero otherwise. The objective of this test is to determine if the relation between credit constraints and trade credit demand depends on firm age.
Results
Trade credit demand
Equation (3) results in Table 4 shows that the importance of trade credit as a financing source increases when bank loans are not available: The coefficient for DENY 9 The bivariate probit estimates are obtained by maximizing a likelihood function based on the joint distribution of TCREDCC (or TCREDLCC) and DENY, which accounts for the endogeneity in the model (see Greene, 2000, Chapter 19) . Alternatively, we could use an instrumental variable model, as in Berger et al. (2002) , Fisman and Love (2003), and Scott (2004) . This approach provides consistent, but not efficient parameter estimates. In (unreported) sensitivity tests, we first obtain fitted values of DENY, using the explanatory variables in Equation (2) as instruments, which we then use as explanatory variables in Equation (1). The results confirm those reported in this paper. Table 4 Multivariate analysis of trade credit importance: TCREDCC and TCREDLCC Bivariate probit is used to jointly estimate Equation (3) in Panel A, which models trade credit demand (TCREDCC and TCREDLCC), and Equation (4) in Panel B, which models the turndown decision (DENY). TCREDCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reported trade credit or credit cards as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. There are 3,159 observations for TCREDCC. TCREDLCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reported trade credit as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. The estimation of this model includes firms listing both trade credit and credit cards as important financing sources, but excluded firms reporting credit cards but not trade credit as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investments, which reduces the number of observations to 2,567. The dependent variable for Equation (4) is DENY, a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm was denied credit on its last loan request, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are defined in is positive and significant at the 0.01 level for both TCREDCC and TCREDLCC. 10 However, the marginal probability of DENY is lower for TCREDLCC. This result 10 A LaGrange multiplier test for heteroskadasticity-based on the full-time equivalent employee intervals (1-2, 3-4, 5-10, 11-16, and 16 or more)-cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal variance across the disturbance terms. Otherwise, a general method of moments approach would have to be used, allowing the variance-covariance matrix structure to be incorporated into the maximum likelihood estimation. is not surprising because loan denial could increase either trade credit or credit card demand and TCREDCC captures both. DIDN'T BORROW is also positive for both TCREDCC and TCREDLCC, but only significant for TCREDCC. Combined, these results suggest that firms turn to trade credit or credit cards for their external financing needs when they do not use bank loans, regardless of whether the decision to forego bank credit was voluntary (DIDN'T BORROW) or involuntary (DENY). Thus, we provide evidence in support of Petersen and Rajan's (1994) pecking order of debt financing. The price proxies both have the correct sign, but only PCTDISC: 0% is significant. These results show that the presence of discounts is positively related to trade credit importance, but the amount (or scale) is not.
The relation between firm size and trade credit use depends on whether TCREDCC or TCREDLCC is the dependent variable. Larger firms (i.e., over $500,000 in sales) are significantly less likely to report trade credit as an important source of funds for TCREDCC. However, these variables are not significant for TCREDLCC. Thus, the only significant relations between size and trade credit demand appear to be driven by credit cards, with larger firms being less likely to rely on credit cards extensively.
Finally, the industry effects are somewhat limited, with only three significant categories at the 0.05 level. Agricultural firms place significantly less importance Table 5 Multivariate analysis of trade credit importance: Years in business and credit availability Bivariate probit is used to estimate the coefficients for all variables in Equation (3) in Panel A and Equation (4) in Panel B. TCREDCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm-reported trade credit or credit cards as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. There are 3,159 observations for TCREDCC. TCREDLCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm-reported trade credit as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. There are 2,567 observations for TCREDLCC. The dependent variable for Equation (4) is DENY, a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm was denied credit on its last loan request, and zero otherwise. DENY in Equation (3) is entered as an interactive term with years in business. YOUNG is a 1/0 variable that takes a value of 1 if years in business is 5 or less, MIDAGE is a 1/0 variable that takes a value of 1 if years in business is between 5 and 15, and OLD is a 1/0 variable that takes a value of 1 if years in business is more than 15. All other independent variables are defined in Table 2 . No answer responses for the independent variables are included in the estimates but are not reported. The marginal probabilities (Marg. P) are evaluated at the mean of each variable. 
Credit availability
Although we are primarily interested in Equation (3) results, Equation (4) results in Table 4 provide additional evidence on factors influencing the loan denial decision. Older firms, larger firms, and faster growing firms are all less likely to face loan denial, as predicted. Banking relationship strength also affects DENY in the expected way, with stronger relationships (i.e., longer duration with the bank or fewer financial institutions used) resulting in a lower probability of being turned down. Finally, DENY is negatively associated with CFI and HHI as expected. All of these effects are present using either TCREDCC or TCREDLCC to measure trade credit demand. Table 5 results are mixed in regard to how DENY and firm age interact to affect trade credit demand. For TCREDCC, little difference exists between the DENY coefficients and marginal probabilities across the three age categories. When trade credit demand excludes credit cards (TCREDLCC), DENY is significant (at the 0.05 level) for YOUNG firms, but is not significant for OLD firms. In addition, the marginal probability for YOUNG firms is about 50% higher. Combined, these results suggest that firm age is not related to how loan denial affects credit card demand, but does influence how loan denial affects trade credit demand. Older firms can access more alternative sources of funds (such as retained earnings) than younger Table 6 Multivariate analysis of trade credit importance using BNEEDSNO Bivariate probit is used to estimate the coefficients for all variables in Equation (3) in Panel A and Equation (4) in Panel B. TCREDCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm-reported trade credit or credit cards as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. There are 3,159 observations for TCREDCC. TCREDLCC in Equation (3) is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm-reported trade credit as the primary or secondary source of financing for working capital or capital investment, and zero otherwise. There are 2,567 observations for TCREDLCC. BNEEDSNO, the dependent variable in Equation (4), takes a value of 1 if the owner reports that they were not able to meet their borrowing needs at all times in the 3 years prior to the survey. The results for TCREDCC and BNEEDSNO are shown in column (1) and the results for TCREDLCC and BNEEDSNO are shown in column (3). The coefficient on BNEEDSNO is also allowed to take a different value depending on whether the firm was turned down in its most recent loan attempt (BNEEDSNO × DENY) or successful (BNEEDSNO × ACCEPT). The results for this specification of Equation (3) firms, making them less likely to increase their reliance on trade credit following loan denial. 11
Years in business and credit availability
Alternative measure of credit availability: BNEEDSNO
We also reestimated Equations (3) and (4) using BNEEDSNO, rather than DENY, as the measure of credit availability. Table 6 reports these results-again using the bivariate probit-in column (1) for TCREDCC and column (3) for TCREDLCC. Overall, there is a very little difference between the coefficient estimates of BNEED-SNO in these columns and those for DENY in Table 4 . Thus, our main results do not appear to be sensitive to the measure of credit availability.
However, the variable BNEEDSNO includes firms that were denied credit on their last loan attempt and those that obtained a loan for an amount lower than originally requested. We separate these effects in the specification shown in columns (2) and (4). Here, the coefficient on BNEEDSNO is allowed to take a different value depending on whether the firm was denied additional credit on its last loan request or approved (ACCEPT). For both TCREDCC and TCREDLCC, the BNEEDSNO coefficient is significantly positive regardless of the outcome of the firm's last loan request. However, the coefficient is significantly larger if the firm was denied any additional credit. Thus, more severe credit constraints have a larger impact on trade credit demand.
Conclusion
Using survey data from a representative sample of U.S. small businesses, this paper investigates the question of whether credit availability affects firms' trade credit demand. The data used in this study are unique because they include a question that assesses the importance of trade credit and credit cards as financing sources relative to bank loans and retained earnings. We create a variable to proxy for trade credit demand from the responses to this question and find that credit constraints imposed by banks have a direct effect on this measure of trade credit and credit card demand. In particular, firms that were denied on their last loan application are more likely to consider trade credit or credit card debt to be important financing sources. Thus, we provide support for Petersen and Rajan's (1994) pecking order of debt financing. When bank credit is not available, firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds, including trade credit and credit cards.
